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A LETTER FROM
Rob
NFL Draft Research
It's been an incredible week at PerThirtySix, with record-breaking traffic. Thank you for all of the
the support and kind comments, it's really been overwhelming. In a world of quick releases and AI
slop, we'll continue to put thought and care into everything we publish, and trust that it will find
its way into good hands.
NFL Draft Efficiency by Position
In light of draft weekend, I launched two pages on PerThirtySix. The first is
NFL Draft Efficiency by Position. It ranks every team at how well they've drafted each position over the last twenty years, ordered
by value over expectation given where each player was selected overall. To no one's surprise, the
Steelers rank #1 overall at drafting WRs, and the 49ers rank #1 at drafting LBs.
Scoring the 2026 Draft Trades
My larger piece of work is focused on draft-day trades. My theory is that NFL teams overpay when they
trade up, but showing that in football is harder than it sounds. Baseball has WAR, which adds across a
roster cleanly. Football does not, and the closest analogues don't survive the addition either; two
competent careers and one elite career do not slot onto a roster the way their points sum.
So the test I ran is the most conservative version of the question, originally posed by Thaler and
Massey (2005). Forget the secondary picks entirely. And forget the chart math where you're adding up
values of all the picks. The team trading up holds the highest pick of the deal, and you would think
the highest pick is the best player of the trade. That's the premium they're paying for, right?
Well, across every pick-for-pick trade since 2006, the trade-up side wins the (very conservative)
best-player comparison
35% of the time. The trade-down side wins
45%. The remaining
20% land inside a five-pVAR coin-flip band, where neither
side's best is decisively better. An illustration of this is Cleveland's 2011 trade-up for Phil
Taylor. Kansas City ended up winning this trade, but only because their later pick (#70) became Justin
Houston, an All-Pro whose career far outproduced Taylor's; their earlier pick (#26, Jonathan Baldwin)
was a bust. Three modest swings beat one big swing more often than not, even before you start adding
their value up.
This gap has narrowed in more recent years, suggesting the market has started to pick up on the
inefficiency. To project this year's 37 pick-for-pick trades, I ran Monte Carlo simulations against
fifteen years of pVAR history. For each pick, an outcome is sampled from the careers of historical
players taken at and near that slot, with closer slots weighted more heavily. The pool tightens near
the top of the draft and widens through the late rounds. A position-weighted mode tilts each draw
toward the drafted player's position group. According to the model, teams are still paying an
excessive premium to trade up — worth it only for teams who are elite at identifying and developing
talent.
After the core analysis was done, I spent endless hours grooming over every pixel of these trade
cards, as Shri can attest to with a continuous stream of screenshots from my local development
versions. I'm really delighted with how they turned out.
— Rob
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